I AM PLEASED to have this opportunity to present a monetarist view of demand management with special reference to the United States' experience. I will attempt to present what appears to me to be, in my country, a general statement of this view of economic stabilization. My remarks, however, may not he consistent with every aspect of the views held by all of those actively engaged on the monetarist side of the current debate. This paper first identifies quite generally the major factors which set the monetarist position apart from the prevailing view regarding economic stabilization. Then, there is a summary of the major propositions of this view of demand management. Following this cbseussion, the United States' experience of the last two decades is analyzed.
The General Monetarist View
In the United States, monetarists have stressed the importance of monetary actions in determining the course of economic activity. Monetary actions include such actions of the Federal Reserve System as changes in the discount rate, changes in commercial hank reserve requirements, and open market purchases and saks of Government securities. They also include the Treasury's management of its cash position. These are the basic exogenous variables of monetary management, with the major emphasis given to open-market transactions.
The role assigned to the money stock in the monetarist analysis is not generally understood. The money stock is most frequently used as an indicator of the thrust or influence of monetary actions on the econonsv. In the United States, there is a close empirical relationship between current and lagged changes in money and changes in nominal GNP. Money is not necessarily considered a causal factor. It is used, instead, as a summary measure of the influence of exogenous monetary variables, primarily those controlled by the Federal Reserve, on aggregate demand. Actions of commercial banks regarding their holdings of excess reserves and actions of households and business firms regarding their holdings of currency, demand deposits, and time deposits are recognized as influencing movements in the money stock, Nevertheless, it is maintained that the usefulness of money as an indicator of central bank monetary influences is not seriously impaired by such actions, because there is considerable empirical evidence that Federal Reserve actions dominate movements in the money stock.
The role assigned to interest rates in this analysis has also been subject to misunderstanding. Contrary to general opinion, interest rates are an important aspect of the monetarist transmission mechanism linking monetary actions to economic activity, but interest rates are no more important than prices of goods and services. In many aspects, this transmission mechanism is close to the Tobin view, except that it takes into consideration many more rates of return and market prices of goods and services. Monetary actions of the Federal Reserve are considered a disturbance which influences the acquisition of financial and real assets. Rates of return on real and financial assets and market prices adjust to create a new equilibrium position of the economy; therefore, these changes are considered the main channels of monetary influence on aggregate demand.
The influence of monetary actions through market interactions is considered to be widely diffused across all of the markets for financial assets, real assets, and services. Consequently, it is contended that the influence of monetary actions on movements in total de-
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mandl is more important for monetary analysis than their influence on demands of individual sectors. This Ts contrary to the more conventional view which first considers the response of individual sector demands to monetary actions. Such responses, in turn, are then summed to give aggregate demand. The monetarist position is that the allocative effects of monetary actions have little hearing, if any, on movements in aggregate demand.
A central monetarist proposition is that the economy is basically stable-and is not necessarily subject to wide variations iii output and employment. In other words, the economy will naturally move along a trend path of output determined by growth in its productive potential. Exogenous events such as wars, droughts, strikes, shifts iii expectations, changes in preferences, and changes in foreign demand may cause variations in output around the trend path. Such variations, however, under most circumstances, will be mild and of relatively short duration. This basic stability is brought about by market forces which change rates of return and prices of goods and services in response to these exogenous events. It is admitted that markets are not perfectly competitive and arc subject to man) rigidities. Such market imperfections, however, do not greatly impair the stabilizing function of markets; they mainly result in an inefficient allocation of resources Market imperfections also influence the time pattern of the response of output and prices to monetary actions.
The basic source of short-run economic instability, which will be discussed in more detail later, is monetary actions which result in accelerations and dccclerations in the rate of money growth. In the long run, however, the trend rate of monetary expansion does not influence output and employment, but only moveinents in the price level and other nominal variables.
Monetarist View of Demand Management
The monetarist view of the role of monetary and fiscal actions in demand management makes a clear distinction between the influence of such actions on real and nominal economic magnitudes. It also dlifFerentiates between the short-run and the long-run aspects of monetary and fiscal actions.
Monetary Actions
The major impact of monetary actions is believed b monetarists to be on long-run movements in nominal economic variables such as nominal GNP, the general price level, and market interest rates, Longrun movements in real economic variables such as output and employment are considered to be little influenced, if at all, by monetary actions. Trend movemnents in real variables are essentially determmed by growth in such factors as the labor force, natural resources, capital stock, and technology'.
In the short run, however, actions of the central bank which change the trendl rate of monetary expansion or produce pronounced variations aroundl a given trend rate exert an impact on both real andl nominal variables. The timing and the extent to svhich such real variables as output and employment arc affected depends on initial conditions at the time of a change in the rate of monetary expansion. Two major initial conditions are the level of resource utilization and the expected rate of inflation. For example, an acceleration in the rate of monetary expansion at a time of a high level of resource utilization will have little short-run influence on output but a quick influence on the price level-On the other hand, a reduction in the rate of monetary expansion will result in slower growth in real output in the short run, with a faster and larger response if there is-a high level of inflationary expectations than if there is a low level.
Fiscal Actions
The mnonetarist view of fiscal actions is that their main impact is on long-run movements of real output. Goverumnent spending and taxing programs can change the rate of growth of potential real output by altering the composition of actual output An expenditure program which re-allocates resources from current consumption (for example, reduced iow income subsidies) to investment (for example, education) will tendl to increase the growth rate of potential output. Or, a tax program which encourages private investment will have -a similar impact on potential output. Since actual output naturally grows--at the same rate as potential output in the long run, these allocative fiscal actions do influence the rate of growth of actual output.
While a faster rate of growth of potential output will tend to reduce the inflationary aspect of a given rate of monetary expansion, this influence is believed to he relatively minor and slow to develop. The reason for this is that the allocative affects of the usual magnitude of such fiscal actions on potential output are not too large and take time to appear.
In the short run, fiscal actions are believed by monetarists to exert sonic but little lasting influence on nominal GNP expansion and, therefore, have little affect on short-run movements of output and employment. It is argued that Government expenditures financed by taxes or borrowing from thd-public tend to crowd out ox'er a fairly short period of time an equal amount of prix~tdt expenditures, either by' interest ratd-and price changes or by credit rationing.
There is somne influence exerted ovd-r the first part of the adjustmnent pc-nod by a given change in Governmnent expenditures financed in this manner; eonsequentlv, an acceleration or deceleration in the rate of c;o\-cmm-nmnc'rmt spending will exert a short-lived influence on total demnand. Changes in tax rates, according to some monetarists, can influence economic activity in the short run inasmuch as such changes alter rates of return on capital ass -ts.
Summary of Views on Demand Management
The inonetarist position on demand management may he summarized as follows:
1. Demand manageinemmt is mainly the use of ruonetary actions to foster an acceptable trend rate of inflation.
2. Short-run instability' of outpmmt and employment can be greatly rednced if monetary actions are avoided which result in accelerations--and decelerations in the rate of money growth.
3. Fiscal actions are not an important aspect of short-run demand mnanagement, but the allocative aspect of snch actions can be important for such other purposes as promoting economic growth or redistributing wealth.
A Monetarist View of Two Decades of Demand Management in the United States
In analy'zing the demand management experience in the United States from the monetarist point of view, thd-last two decades will be divided into three episodes involving different trendl rates of gro\vth of the money' stock. The experience of each episode will be presented, and then reasons for the recorded course of money supply growth will be developed.
Demand Management Experience
The last twenty-y'ears can be divided into three episodes-aecordmg to trend rates of monetary' expansion -1952 to 196~,when money' grew at a 1.7 per cent averagc-annual rate; 1962 to 1966, when the trend rate of mnonetary-growth \vas accelerated to a 3.7 per cent annual rate; and 1966 to the present, when there was a further acceleration to a 6.1 per cent annual rate of growth in the money stock (Chart I).
During the decade ending in 1962, demand mnanagement was primarily the Federal Reserve's rcsponsibiiity'. Only one major fiscal action, the income tax cut of 1954, was undertaken for the purpose of influencing aggregate demand. An examination of the published minutes of the Federal Open Market Comnmittee indicates that several mnonetary actions were taken for the purpose of promoting economic stability'. Fromn 1952 to 1962, the United States' money stock increased at a 1.7 per cent a~-erageannual rate. There was, however, considerable short-run variability around this trend rate, with periods of fairly rapid increase followed by absolute decrease.
The price level performance, except for a short burst of inflation in 1956 and 1957 , \vas very good, and such performnanee continued into 1965. The GNP deflator rose at a trend rate of less than 2 per cent from 1952 to 1965. Performance of the real sector of the American economy, however, was far fromn acceptable as the decade \vas marked by three recessions. Over this ten year period, the unemployment rate averaged 4.5 per cent. Despite an average unemploy'ment rate of this mnagnitude, however, real output grew only slightly less rapidly than the 3.5 per cent estimated growth rate of potential output.
The next episode -1962 to 1.966 -marked the emergence of attem~ipts-at" fine tuning" movements in aggregate demand. Fiscal actions became the mnain tool of such mnanagement of the economy, while mnonetary actions, in the Keynesian tradition, were assigned a purely accommnodative role. Little considcration was given to the possibility' that monetary actions could exert any independent influence.
Major fiscal actions undertaken during this perIod for purposes of stimulating aggregate demand were the investmnent tax credit audi accelerated depreciation provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962, the Revenue Act of 1964 which reduced individual and corporate income tax rates, and the Excise Tax Reductiomi Act of 1965. Then as inflationary pressures began to mount late in the period, the Investment Credit Suspension Act of 1966 was adopted to reduce growth in aggregate demand. Many have viewed the movements in output and employment from 1962 to 1966 as very satisfactory. Output rose rapidly, eliminating the gap between potential and actual output which had existed in the early 1960's. As a result, the unemploymneut rate fell from 5.5 per cent in 1962 to less than 4 per cent in 1966. These developments have been cited as evidence proving the success of the fiscal, "fine-tuning" view of demand management.
The last episode -1966 to the present -is one in which attempts were made to dampen growth in aggregate demand so as to curb an accelerating inflation. An overriding consideration, however, was to accomplish this objective without too great a loss of output and employment. First, fiscal actions were used, and then mnonetary actions.
The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 imposed a temporary 10 per cent surcharge on individual and corporate income taxes and restricted the rate of increase in Federal Governmneut expenditures. Next, the investment tax credit, which had been restored in early 1967, was repealed. Then as output grew more slo\vly later in the period and the unemnploymcnt rate rose, the income tax surcharge was allowed to phase out.
Monetary actions were of a stop-and-go nature similar to fiscal actions. At times during the period, monetary actions were assigned an independent role in demnand management in contrast to the purely accommnodative role during the 1962-66 episode. In addition, greater emphasis was placed on controlling movements in the mnouey stock, Money grew at a 7 per cent annual rate in 1967 and 1968. Then, steps were taken to curb inflation, and money grew at a markedly lower 3 per cent rate in 1969. But when considerable economic slack appeared, the rate of monetary expansion was acceierated to a 5 per cent rate in 1970 and to a 10 per cent rate thus far in 1971. The oven-all trend rate of monetary expansion over the whole four and one-half year period was about 6 per cent, a marked acceleration from the 3.7 per cent rate recorded from 1962 to 1966 (Chart I).
The performance of the Amnerican economy since 1966 has been considered highly unsatisfactory. The results of monetary and fiscal actions since 1966 have been a recession accompanied by a high rate of inflation. Inflation accelerated to over a 5 per cent annual rate, and the unemployment rate rose to over 6 per cent.
The experience of the last two decades demonstrates the great lack of success of demand management in the United States. This is particularly' evident in the lQ 6 O's when very' activist stabilization actions were undertaken. Some cite this experience as demonstrating the inability of traditional monetary and fiscal actions to promote economic stability-. I do not accept such a view. Instead, I contend that the generally' accepted economic foundation of demand managemneut is faulty. Basing stabilization actions on this foundation is a sure formnula for failure.
Reasons for Failure of Stabilization Policies
I attribute the very poor record of United States economic stabilization efforts to four main factors. First, and foremost, is lack of understanding of the independent impact of mnouetary actions, as mneasured by changes in the money stock, on the course of economic activity. Second, is the great emphasis given to guiding the course of real variables -output and employment -and the little emphasis, except for short intervals of time, given to controlling inflation. Third, is the great emphasis given to fiscal actions, especially in the 1960's. Fourth, is the use of market interest rates as-an indicator of the influence of monetary actions on econonuc activity.
Role of Monetary Actions Ignored -According to the monetanist view, central bank actions which alter the trend growth rate of the money stock exert an important long-run influence on nominal GNP and the price level. Accelerations and decelerations of the money stock have only an important short-run influence on output and employmnent. Evidence supporting these two propositions is presented in Charts I and II.T he money stock panel (Chart I) indicates three trend growth rates of mnonetary expansion, which were set forth in the preceding section. Money grew at a 1.7 per cent average annual rate from 1/1952 to 111/ 1962. Money growth then accelerated to a 3.7 per cent trend rate to IV/1966 and to a 6.1 per cent trend rate to 11/1971. Total spending (nominal GNP) and the price level responded to the changes in the trend rate of monetary expansion as postulated by monetarists. Total spending rose at a 4.9 per cent annual rate from If1952 to 1/1963 and then rose at a 7,4 per cent trend rate. The price level (GNP deflator) rose first at a 1.8 per cent rate, then at a 3.8 pen cent rate, and since II!1969 at a 5.4 per cent rate. The corporatẽ Charts have been updated from those presented at the conference to include data for 11/1971. Aaa bond rate, another nominal magnitude, also moved in a manner similar to changes in the trend growth of money.
Chart II, top panel, presents deviations in the money stock from its trend growth. These deviations are expressed as the ratio of the money stock to its trend value for each quarter. The dashed line at the end of each episode is the ratio calculated on the basis of the previous episode's trend for a few quarters after a change in the trend. This overlap is used to allow for the fact that a change in the trend growth of money is not recognized immediately. The second panel presents the ratio of actual real CNP to potential real GNP. The trend growth of potential real GNP, as indicated on the second panel, has been estimated by the Council of Economic Advisers. The bottom panel presents the unemployment rate.
Regardless of the trend rate of monetary growth (1.7, 3.7, or 6.1 per cent), whenever the ratio of money to its trend value rose (an acceleration in money growth), the ratio of actual real GNP to its potential value rose soon thereafter, and the unemployment rate fell. The opposite happened whenever the rate of money growth decelerated. Despite smmch short-run developments and despite different trend rates of money growth, the unemployment rate averaged about the same from 1952 to 1962, when money growth was relatively slow, as from 1962 to 1971, when the trend rate of money growth was much greater.
The developments summarized in Chart II are consistent svith the monetarist view that accelerations and decelerations of monetary expansion exercise a short-run influence on output and employment, hut there is little, if any, long-run influence. These influences were given little consideration in demand management, particularly during the activist period from 1962 to 1968.
Focus Placed on Output and Employment -Another factor accounting for the poor stabilization record in the United States is the fact that demand management has been primarily focused on producing desired movements in output and employment. This was true of monetary actions for the 1950's and early 1960's when some independent monetamy actions were taken, the period in the mid-l960's of fine tuning using planned fiscal actions and accommodative monetary actions, and the active use of monetary actions after 1968.
If the economy responds to monetary actions, as
indicated above, a focus of policy primarily on output and employment can explain the existence of both Page 8 inflation and high unemployment. In attempting to promote rapid expansion of real output after mid-1962, active use of fiscal actions and accommodating monetary actions resulted in the money stock rising at an accelerated rate until early 1966. Inflation accelerated, and in response, monetary authorities redmmced drastically the rate of money growth for twd) quarters. But then when economic slack--appeared in early 1967, money growth was a 11 o~~'e~i to accelerate to a trend rate greater than the previomis one. This sequence of events happened again in 1969 and 1970, producing a still higher rate of money growth. In these latter years, however, monetary actions were on more of a discretionary basis than earlier.
The end result, thus far, of guiding stabilization policy on real variables has been higher and higher trend rates of monetary expansion and greater inflation, Periodically, there have been temporary periods of monetary restraint to curb inflation, which in turn have produced slower ommtput growth and rising unemnployment. Such developments, in turn, induce stabilization authorities to initiate a still higher trend rate of money growth, which leads to further inflation. Thus, the American economy may be faced with high rates of inflation withommt achieving economic stability, unless the main emphasis of policy is shifted to curbing inflation.
Main Emphasis Given to Fiscal Actions -A third
reason for the poor record of economic stabilization in the United States is the emphasis given to fiscal actions, particularly from 1962 to 1968. Until recently, fiscal actions in the form of Government spending and taxing programs have been given the main emphasis in economic stabilization efforts to the virtual exclusion of monetary actions. Such a development was an outgrowth of conventional economuics which for the past 25 years has taught that Federal Reserve actions exercise little independent influence on total demand for goods and services.
According to this widely accepted view, changes in the money stock bring about changes in market interest rates, but total demand is little influenced by interest rate movements. Consequently, monetary actions have been thought to he of little use in any program of economic stabilization. On the other hand, increased Government expenditures are viewed as adding directly to total demand and tax reductions as adding to disposable income which would be used to purchase goods and services. Consequently, this view has argued that fiscal actions have an immediate and powerful influence on total spending. This analysis has received wide acceptance as evidenced in dis- It is my belief that the accelerating inflation of the last half of the 1960's can he attributed, in large part, to the great emphasis given to fiscal actions aix! the downgrading of monetary influence. Monetary' authorities did not reduce the rapid rate of monetary' expansion during a large part of that period becammse there was a desire to let fiscal actions cmmrl) inflation and a belief by' some that only fiscal actions would be effective. Then, when restrictive fiscal actions were taken in mid-1968 -the smmrtax and! slower increases in Government spending -many economists, on the basis of conventional wisdomn, predicted "fiscal over-kill" by early 1969. In response to such predictions, monetary' authorities continued even more expansionamy actions. thc extc nt of the irmcic 1St is ms too gic 'it inc tusc of the dmsloc itmons is luch hid occmmrrc d in thc s ivmngs mud hommsing mnchmstric s lmt orclcr to forc stall fum thcdislocitions thcrc is is ii dc.smmc to hold I) ick thc umaguitmmde of interest rate increases; this led to passage of the Interest Rate Control Act of 1966. Presently there is a reluctance to allow rates to rise for ft mr of chokmng off thc c commomnmc iccox cii Attempts to hold back interest mate increases at a time of expanding economic activity require great injections of hank reserves which coutribmmte to a rapid growth in the money stock. This, in turn, fosters excessive total demand and! feeds further the fires of inflation.
Faulty Method of Monetary Management Used
The focus on market interest rates also helped to bring about the extremely high rates of monetary grosvth during 1967 and 1968 as a result of the decision to flu in~thc cxp tusmomi of thc \ mc tn tin W im mud rapidly rising ivelfare programs by-borrowing rather thamm exclusively' by taxes. During 1967 mimic! 1968, large Government financings in the security' markets caused the Federal Reserve, because of an evc-n-keel policy of stabilizing money markets at times of Covem-nment bom-rosviug, to buy large qimantities of Government securities. As mentioned earlier, there was great impward pressure on market interest rates from the private scetom Ilcncc is mth I irgc dc mands fom funds from both private sources and the Government, large injections of member bank reserves svere required for even-keeling by the Federal Reserve. These injections helped to foster rapid growth in the muoney stock.
Conclusions
Now to answer the question posed for this conference, "Demand Management, Illusion or Reality?" According to the monetarist viesv, time ansiver is "reality," but the essence of such reality is markedly different than that of the more conventional, activist view of demand management. Monetary actions should be directed primarily at fostering an acceptable rate of inflation; this requires the follosving of an appropriate trend rate of monetary expansion. With regard to output and employment, monetary actions should be conducted so as not to be a source of economic instability; this requures the avoidance of periods of marked accelerations and decelerations in the rate of money growth. Thus, I believe that there are strong economic reasons for the monetary growth rule -and little room for discretionary, short-ruin monetary management.
The recent American experience demonstrates the potential of short-run monetamy actions to produce both inflation and economic instability. For instance, the 6 per cent trend grosvth of money since 1966, given the 1.5 per cent trend increase in velocity that
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has occurred since then, is consistent with a 7 to 8 per cent annual rate of increase in nominal GNP. If potential real output should continue to rise at its recent 4.3 per cent annual rate, this rate of money growth implies a trend rate of inflation between 3 and 4 per cent. If velocity, hoivever, should resume its higher 3.5 per cent average annual rate of increase recorded front 1952 to 1966, the recent trend rate of money growth implies a 5 to 6 per cent rate of inflation. The monetary restraint of 1.969, when money rose at only a 3 per cent rate, produced the recent recession in the United States, but since this was only a relatively short-lived deceleration in money growth, the rate of inflation was little influenced.
Stabilization actions since 1966 have not been conducive to a marked reduction in the rate of inflation. The United States inflation will not be reduced substantially until a lower trend rate of money growth is established; a 3 to 4 per cent rate probably would he optima!. Since the present high rate of inflation has been in existence for several years, however, expectations are for a continued high rate of price advance. In such a case, a move to less expansionary monetary actions will result in considerable adjustment costs in terms of slower expansion in output and employment. Such costs cannot he avoided if the United States inflation is ever to he contained, and attempts to avoid them will probably lead to higher rates of inflation. No. 70. 
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